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NOTES
Foreign Exchange Controls and Public Policy:
Strange Bedfellows of United States Law
Plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries arising from the actions of
foreign governments and their instrumentalities have traditionally
encountered imposing barriers. The age-old maxim that "the king
can do no wrong" has retained remarkable vitality in cases involving
foreign sovereigns. Congress attempted to establish uniformity of
U.S. policy in this area with its 1976 enactment of the Foreign Sover-
ign Immunities Act (FSIA).I The case law of the intervening decade,
however, has demonstrated both inadequacies of omission in the
FSIA statutory scheme and a somewhat inconsistent pattern of inter-
pretation by U.S. courts of certain of its provisions. De Sanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicaragua,2 a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, is one of a growing number of cases arising under
the FSIA which involve the liability of foreign banks to individual
plaintiffs in the United States. In deciding these cases, courts are
invariably hampered in their attempts to define the scope of the
FSIA's exceptions to sovereign immunity by the Act's own ambigu-
ity, especially in situations involving the imposition by foreign gov-
ernments of exchange control legislation.
This Note focuses on the De Sanchez decision as a particularly
illustrative example of the alternative theories of recovery available
to a plaintiff pursuing an action against a foreign bank through the
FSIA, and the corresponding limitations on each. It further attempts
to define the role played by exchange control regulations, especially
as those regulations pertain to the Act's commercial activities excep-
tion. 3 Finally, the Note offers a discussion of the likely effects of pro-
posed revisions to the FSIA on cases involving foreign banks and
I Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(2)-
(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982)).
2 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982) provides an exception to immunity in any case
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States ....
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more generally suggests other possible means of increasing the relia-
bility of U.S. policy on foreign sovereign immunity.
Josefina Najarro de Sanchez, plaintiff in the present case, is the
wife of General Herberto Sanchez, former Minister of Defense under
the Nicaraguan government of President Antonio Somoza. 4 Her dif-
ficulties arose in the context and as an indirect result of the deposi-
tion of the Somoza regime by the presently ruling Sandinistas. In
September 1978 Ms. Sanchez purchased a certificate of deposit (CD)
in the amount of $150,000 from Banco Nacional de Nicaragua, a
then privately-owned commercial Nicaraguan bank. 5 In June of the
following year, with the collapse of the Somoza government immi-
nent, Ms. Sanchez left the country with plans to settle in the Miami
area. Shortly thereafter, she instructed her husband, still in Nicara-
gua, to have the certificate redeemed. Banco Nacional was unable to
comply with the request due to a shortage of dollars. 6 Fortunately
for the plaintiff, however, Dr. Roberto Incer, President of the Nicara-
guan Central Bank (Banco Central de Nicaragua) was also a cousin of
General Sanchez. Dr. Incer intervened and subsequently instructed
Banco Central to issue a check to Sanchez in the amount of $150,000
and to debit the account of Banco Nacional in a like amount. 7 The
check, drawn on Banco Central's account with Citizens and Southern
International Bank (C&S) of New Orleans and immediately for-
warded to Ms. Sanchez, is at the center of the present controversy.
When Ms. Sanchez presented the check at the C&S main office
in mid-July, she discovered that she faced difficulties. Pursuant to its
rights under the Uniform Commercial Code,8 C&S refused to honor
the check pending a resolution of the political conflict in Nicaragua.
OnJuly 23, 1979, C&S received a telex from the new government of
that country confirming an earlier telephoned instruction that the as-
sets of Banco Central's account be frozen. Soon thereafter, the new
government of Nicaragua enacted provisions regulating the alloca-
tion of the country's remaining foreign exchange resources.9 As a
4 De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1387.
5 Id. The certificate, made payable in U.S. dollars, was to mature on October 6,
1982. It specified that redemption could not occur before this date. Id.
6 Id. President Somoza himself wrote Banco Nacional requesting that plaintiff's cer-
tificate be redeemed as a "special case." Id.
7 Id. at 1388. Dr. Arturo Cruz, president of Banco Central under the new regime,
described this transaction as an "outright violation" of Nicaraguan foreign exchange law.
Id. at 1389 n.2.
8 U.C.C. § 4-403 (1978) provides in pertinent part
(1) A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable
for his account but the order must be received at such time and in such a
manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it ...
(2) An oral order is binding upon the bank only for fourteen calendar days
unless confirmed in writing within that period. ...
9 All sales of foreign exchange were temporarily halted in late August while the gov-
ernment compiled a list of priorities for imports. 1980 INT'L MONETARY FUND ANN. REP.
ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 290.
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result, the bank's obligation to Ms. Sanchez was determined to be of
insufficient priority to warrant payment.' 0
Ms. Sanchez thereafter brought suit for payment of the check in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
alleging breach of duty, misrepresentation, conversion, and breach
of contract, and claiming $150,000 in damages plus interest. Banco
Central moved to dismiss the action based on lack of jurisdiction."I
The motion was denied, and Banco Central appealed.
The ability to bring suit against a foreign sovereign has long
been limited by the principle of foreign sovereign immunity and the
act of state doctrine.' 2 In its 1812 resolution of Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon ' 3 the Supreme Court was offered its first opportunity to
enunciate U.S. policy in this area.' 4 Chief Justice Marshall, writing
for a unanimous Court, set forth a rule of sovereign immunity based
on an interpretation of the common law, which was sensible in its
parameters.' 5 That decision, however, was subsequently relied on
10 770 F.2d at 1388. The check was placed in the category of "[slales of foreign
exchange to the National Guard ...and to those who are associated or friends of the
National Guard." Id. at 1388 (citing Deposition of Arturo Cruz at 30).
I De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981), aff'd,
770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
Banco Central filed an additional motion to dismiss following the Second Circuit's
decision in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd,
103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983), which held there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction in a
controversy between aliens. The district court proceedings were stayed pending the
Supreme Court ruling in that case.
In Verlinden a Dutch corporation brought suit in U.S. district court for anticipatory
breach of a letter of credit by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. On appeal, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that neither the diversity clause nor the "arising under"
clause of article III is broad enough to confer jurisdiction over actions by foreign plaintiffs
against foreign sovereigns. Verlinden, 647 F.2d 320. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling
that the "jurisdictional grant is within the bounds of Article III, since every action against a
foreign sovereign necessarily involves application of a body of substantive federal law, and
accordingly arises under federal law, within the meaning of Article III." 103 S. Ct. at
1973. After this Supreme Court reversal, the stay on the De Sanchez proceeding was lifted.
12 The "act of state" doctrine, on which ground the district court ultimately dis-
missed Ms. Sanchez' action, precludes U.S. courts from "inquiring into the validity of gov-
ernmental acts of a recognized foreign sovereign committed within its own territory."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 32 (5th ed. 1979); See Banco Central de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
13 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
14 In Schooner Exchange shipowners alleged wrongful confiscation of their vessel by
Napoleon's navy. ChiefJustice Marshall, in explaining the particular necessity of granting
immunity in cases involving foreign war vessels, wrote:
She [the vessel] constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts
under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign: is employed by
him in national objects. He has many and powerful motives for preventing
those objects from being defeated by the interference of a foreign state.
Such interference cannot take place without affecting his power and his
dignity.
Id. at 144.
15 The holding of Schooner Exchange was expressly limited to cases involving military
property. Mr. Dallas, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania, anticipated even
then the need for a commercial exception by conceding that "if the sovereign descend
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for the United States' adoption of the "absolute doctrine" which in-
terprets international law as precluding the courts of one state from
acquiring jurisdiction over the person or property of a foreign
state. 16
Some mitigation of the harsh results of the absolute doctrine
was accomplished over the years through the adoption of a number
of judicial exceptions. 17 Otherwise, the doctrine remained virtually
intact until the middle part of this century. As the United States fi-
nally began abandoning its self-proclaimed post-World War I policy
of isolationism, it became increasingly apparent to both the execu-
tive and judicial branches that the absolute doctrine had lost its vital-
ity. Courts increasingly came to rely on the State Department's
judgment in making sovereign immunity determinations' 8 due both
to the Department's presumed expertise in the area of foreign affairs
and to avoid embarrassing conflicts among the governmental
branches. Formal adoption of this policy of executive intervention
came with the issuance of the Tate Letter by the U.S. State Depart-
ment in 1952.19 No longer would foreign sovereigns enjoy absolute
immunity from suit in the United States. Under the newly adopted
restrictive theory, implemented jointly by the executive and judicial
branches, immunity presumably would only be granted to sovereigns
and their instrumentalities "in respect of governmental acts (acts iure
imperii), not in respect of commercial acts (acts lure gestonis)." 20
State Department involvement in these jurisdictional determina-
tions resulted in a number of decisions based upon political rather
than strictly legal considerations. 2' Thus, one of Congress' primary
purposes in its 1976 enactment of the FSIA was to "depoliticize"
sovereign immunity decisions by transferring the entire decision
from the throne and become a merchant, he submits to the laws of the country. If he
contract private debts, his private funds are liable." Id. at 123.
16 M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 110 (4th ed.
1982).
17 See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (if action is in ren,
immunity will be refused under certain circumstances); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922) (no immunity for sov-
ereign instrumentality incorporated under state law).
18 See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74
(1938) ("If the claim is recognized and allowed by the executive branch of the govern-
ment, it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel upon appropriate suggestion by
the Attorney General of the United States, or other officer acting under his direction.").
19 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL.
984 (1952). According to Mr. Tate, "the widespread and increasing practice on the part of
governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will
enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts."
Id.
20 M. AKEHURST, supra note 16, at 110.
21 See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (State Department recom-
mends immunity for Cuban merchant vessel while at the same time conducting delicate
negotiations with Cuban government over hijacked commercial airliner).
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making process back to the judicial branch. 22 Central to the struc-
ture of the Act is section 1604, setting forth the general rule of im-
munity of foreign states from jurisdiction. 23 Section 1605 provides a
number of exceptions to this general grant of immunity, the most
significant being section 1605(a)(2), directed at governmental enti-
ties engaged in essentially commercial endeavors. 24
One of the alternative grounds for exercising jurisdiction over
Banco Central was its possible lack of immunity pursuant to this
commercial exception to the FSIA.25 In short, plaintiff argued that
Banco Central is by nature 26 a commercial institution, and similarly,
that the transaction in question, the issuance and nonpayment of the
check, was a commercial act. The defendant bank refuted this allega-
tion, claiming that all determinations of proper allocation of foreign
exchange reserves are made within the framework of governmentally
enacted exchange control regulations, making the determinations
themselves governmental.2 7 A threshold question to resolving the
present controversy would thus seem to be the proper characteriza-
tion of exchange control restrictions, an issue which the De Sanchez
'court chose to ignore.2 8
Modern nations faced with a shortage of foreign exchange seem
almost automatically to resort to some form of exchange control reg-
ulation. These measures are, in general, "designed to maintain the
international value of a nation's own currency and improve its bal-
ance of payments position by regulating the purchase and sale of for-
eign currency." 29 The adoption of such controls may be prompted
by any one or a combination of economic exigencies including: a
decline in the price of export commodities, capital flight induced by
a deteriorating exchange rate, or a refusal by foreign lending institu-
tions to continue liberal payment rescheduling policies due simply to
22 National Airmotive Corp. v. Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1980).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982) reads
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States except as provided in
sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
24 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), supra note 3. Other exceptions to immunity include
§ 1605(a)(1) (express or implied waiver of immunity), § 1605(a)(4) (rights in property ac-
quired by succession or gift), and § 1605(b) (certain suits in admiralty). 28 U.S.C. § 1605
(1982).
25 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
26 Id. § 1603(d) states:
The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose.
27 De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1393.
28 An account of the initial imposition of excha-nge controls and the economic consid-
erations which prompted the move is provided in the district court disposition. De Sanchez,
515 F. Supp. at 908-09.
29 C. AMMER & D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 157 (1979).
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a lack of confidence.30 The growing debt problems of the lesser de-
veloped countries have resulted in an increase in litigation involving
foreign exchange law.3 ' Nonetheless, courts confronted with con-
flicts in this area, especially regarding the issue ofjurisdiction under
the FSIA, often tend to overlook significant considerations.
Regardless of the tendency of exchange controls to operate to
the detriment of foreign creditors, they are not generally declared in
violation of public policy by the courts of foreign jurisdictions.3 2 As
F.A. Mann, a noted commentator on the legal aspects of exchange
restrictions, has explained:
The reason does not lie so much in the fact that very many States
have been compelled from time to time to adopt them [exchange
controls] and that, consequently, it is not open to the courts to con-
demn foreign legislation that is not different from the legislation of
their own country. The real reason is that exchange control is
merely an aspect or a ramification of a system of physical control to
which the modern world has become used, which it does not in gen-
eral abhor, and to which it applies established principles of law.33
Therefore, public policy offers little protection to the foreign credi-
tor when controls are necessary and properly limited.34
This does not mean, however, that public policy may not assert
itself against exchange control restrictions which are not necessary
or which are unfairly implemented. Again, as Mann states:
The legislation of foreign countries may be so oppressive or discrim-
inatory in character or application or so inconsistent with treaty obli-
gations . . . or so contrary to the fundamental rights of man's
personal freedom or otherwise so opposed to the policy of English
law that it may have to be denied recognition in this country. 3
Thus, it might be said that exchange controls carry with them merely
a presumption of validity.3 6
30 See W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE STABILITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 22,
62-63 (1983).
A significant body of commentary and case law on the consequences of exchange leg-
islation arose in the wake of the Mexican economic crisis of 1982. See, e.g., Wolf v. Banco
Nacional de Mexico, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985);
Braka v. Bancomer, 589 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
See generally Symposium on Doing Business in Mexico: The Impact of Its Financial Crisis, 18 INT'L
LAw. 285 (1984).
31 See generally DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT (L. Franco & M. Seiber eds. 1979).
32 F. A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 404-405 (4th ed. 1982). Mann also
recognizes authority for the proposition that exchange controls are incapable of interna-
tional recognition. Id. at 402 nn.5-7.
33 Id. at 405 (the author goes on to analogize exchange controls to import and export
restrictions which are given virtually universal recognition).
34 There is case law, however, to the effect that Switzerland may refuse recognition of
all foreign exchange controls as contrary to Swiss ordre public. The courts of Austria, Ger-
many, and Norway have occasionally expressed similar views. Id. at 402-03 nn.8-16.
35 Id. at 406.
36 It must be stressed that a dearth of U.S. cases support the principle that foreign
exchange controls may be incompatible with domestic public policy. See Allied Bank Int'l
v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985); Kassel v. N.V.
Nederlansch Amerikaansche Stoomvart Maatschappij, 261 A.D. 71, 24 N.Y.S.2d 450
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The enforceability of a nation's exchange control restrictions
may well be influenced by its status as a member of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). 3 7 This organization, created at the Bretton
Woods International Monetary Conference of July 1944,38 serves
through various means to promote stability among the economies of
its members.A9 Article VIII, section 2(B) of the Fund's Articles of
Agreement is the pivotal provision on the issue of exchange con-
trols.40 This section provides that where exchange control regula-
tions have been implemented pursuant to IMF guidelines, any
exchange contract that is found to be inconsistent with those regula-
tions is unenforceable in the courts of all Fund members. 4 1 Even
within the IMF framework, however, public policy considerations
need not be overlooked. 4 2 In a 1970 decision,43 the Dutch Hoge
Raad had the opportunity to consider whether Indonesian exchange
controls implemented in violation of Netherlands' public policy must
nonetheless be given effect due to IMF membership by both nations.
The court concluded that the Bretton Woods agreement was no bar
(1940) (refusing recognition of internal exchange laws of the German Reich where con-
tract sued on was substantially performed in New York). But see French v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968) (pronouncing the
widely accepted U.S. view that foreign exchange controls are to-be accepted as a normal
measure of government).
37 Both the U.S. and Nicaragua are IMF members.
38 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, amended May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S.
No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 226, amended Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937
[hereinafter cited as Articles of Agreement].
39 The broad purposes of the IMF are "to promote international monetary coopera-
tion, facilitate the expanded and balanced growth of international trade, promote ex-
change stability, help establish a multilateral system of payments for current transactions
among members, and make available to members the fund's resources." C. AMMER & D.
AMMER, supra note 29, at 239. See also, Articles of Agreement, supra note 38, at art. I.
40 Articles of Agreement, supra note 38, art. VIII, § 2(b) provides:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this agreement shall be unenforceable in the terri-
tories of any member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooper-
ate in measures for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations
of either member more effective, provided that such measure and regulations
are consistent with this Agreement.
41 International Monetary Fund, Doc. No. 446-4 (June 10, 1949).
42 On this issue, Mann has stated that
although exchange control regulations as a whole may be maintained consist-
ently with the Fund Agreement, certain of their specific effects may be such
as to require or permit the refusal to apply them in a given case on the
ground of public policy. This may occur when their application would be
discriminatory or penal in character or otherwise obnoxious. There is noth-
ing in the Fund Agreement that would compel the courts in a given case to
reach decisions which are offensive to their sense of justice; they are pre-
cluded only from ignoring a member State's exchange control regulations as
a matter or principle of a priori reasoning.
F.A. MANN, supra note 32, at 376.
43 Indonesian Corporation P.T. Escomptobank v. N.V. Assurantie Maatschappij de
Nederlanden van 1845, 1965 N.J. 81, 40 INT'L L. REP. 7 (1970). The Hoge Raad is the
highest court of the Netherlands.
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to the action inasmuch as it concerns only "normal financial relations
between states."'44 The majority international view is, admittedly,
contrary to that of the Dutch case,45 but at least the rationale of
those nation's positions has received expression in the courts. In
general, the approach of U.S. courts is to accept any action of a for-
eign state done within the framework of exchange control regula-
tions as governmental, without ever considering whether the action
might violate public policy.46
Indeed, in one of the few cases in which U.S. public policy has
been considered, the court did so on rehearing and only after inter-
vention by the executive branch. Allied Bank International v. Banco
Credito Agricola47 involved a syndicate of U.S. banks which had found
itself unable to recover the balance due on certain promissory notes
from Costa Rican banks. Payment of the notes had been suspended
when, in response to escalating national economic problems, the
governmentally-run Costa Rican Central Bank issued regulations
which had the effect of suspending the majority of external debt pay-
ments. A later executive decree made all payments of external debt
subject to express approval by Central Bank.48 When the U.S. syndi-
cate failed to obtain this approval, it brought suit to accelerate the
notes and recover their balance. Initially, the court held for the de-
fendant stating that "the legislative and judicial branches of our gov-
ernment fully supported Costa Rica's actions and all of the economic
ramifications. "49
Subsequently, the Justice Department joined the litigation as
amicus curiae and disputed the court's reasoning. Despite Costa
Rica's IMF membership, theJustice Department brief attacked Costa
Rica's actions as a "unilateral restructuring of private obligations...
inconsistent with United States policy." 50 Specifically, the Justice
Department brief explained that the Costa Rican plan was inconsis-
tent with the IMF strategy of debt resolution "grounded in the un-
derstanding that, while parties may agree to renegotiate conditions
of payment, the underlying obligations to pay nevertheless remain
valid. 1 5  On the basis of theJustice Department's findings, the court
44 Id. at 98, 40 INT'L L. REP. at 15.
45 See Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 534, 110 N.E.2d 6, 7, 110
N.Y.S.2d 446, 447 (1953) ("the Czechoslovakian currency control laws in question cannot
here be deemed to be offensive on that score [as against public policy], since our Federal
Government and the Czechoslovakian Government are members of the International
Monetary Fund...").
46 Essential to remember in this context is that the burden of establishing FSIA im-
munity lies with the party claiming it. H.R. REP. No. 94, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604.
47 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
48 Id. at 519.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. Indeed, art. VIII, § 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement, which mandates enforce-
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of appeals vacated its earlier judgment and ultimately held for the
plaintiffs. 52
The De Sanchez court was faced with a foreign exchange control
arrangement remarkably similar to that in Allied Bank. Banco Central
de Nicaragua, like its Costa Rican counterpart, was given authority to
determine what foreign debts would be paid.53
Ms. Sanchez' check was categorized by the bank as "sales of for-
eign exchange to the National Guard ... and to those who are associ-
ated or friends of the National Guard."5 4 Debts in this category were
ultimately determined to be of insufficient priority to warrant pay-
ment. Under the FSIA commercial activity exception, a sovereign or
its instrumentality will be amenable to suit in the United States
whenever the transaction giving rise to the complaint is commercial
in nature. 55 The principal reason cited by the court for denying Ms.
Sanchez' claim of commercial status was that Banco Central's actions
were carried out in furtherance of its "responsibility for the control
and management of Nicaragua's monetary reserves" pursuant to ex-
change regulations.5 6
Two factors indicate that the De Sanchez court should, at a
minimum, have considered possible policy implications of the Nica-
raguan exchange regulations before making its commercial/govern-
mental determination. First, as in Allied Bank, there is no evidence in
De Sanchez that the Nicaraguan Central Bank's repayment plan was
grounded in the broad IMF policy of attempting to renegotiate con-
ditions of payment.57 Instead, Ms. Sanchez, like the plaintiff bank
syndicate, had been denied payment altogether. Need the executive
branch intervene in every instance before a court will recognize that
exchange controls violate public policy?58 A primary purpose of
Congress' enactment of the FSIA was to eliminate the necessity of
just this type of executive involvement in sovereign immunity dis-
putes. 59 No impediments exist preventing an accurate judicial as-
sessment of whether foreign exchange controls are discriminatory,
overly stringent, or otherwise unfair. 60
In addition, the explanation offered by Banco Central for refus-
ment of exchange controls within the IMF, is specifically limited to regulations "consistent
with this agreement." Articles of Agreement, supra note 40.
52 757 F.2d at 523.
53 De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1388.
.54 Id.
55 28 U.S.C. § 1 605(a)(2) (1982).
56 770 F.2d at 1393.
57 See Articles of Agreement, supra note 40. See also supra note 51.
58 For an affirmative answer see Remarks of Beverly Carl, 1980 AM. Soc. INT'L L.
PROC. 77-78.
59 See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
60 The burden of bringing forth evidence on the governmental character of the ex-
change controls would seemingly lie with the foreign sovereign. H.R. REP., supra note 46.
1986] 377
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
ing payment of Ms. Sanchez' check-her association with a particular
group-has been cited as a rationale for invalidating such controls. 6 '
In the decision of Re Lord Cable62 a British court, in declaring that it
would recognize Indian exchange controls, posited that "[d]ifferent
considerations might conceivably apply if the particular control legis-
lation had been passed or was being used as an instrument of op-
pression or discrimination. ' 63 Indeed, the logic of invalidating
discriminatory exchange control provisions as inappropriate compo-
nents of an economic policy is readily apparent.
Bypassing any consideration of public policy implications, the
court's unanimous opinion in De Sanchez applied the accepted FSIA
analytical approach to resolve the commercial/governmental ques-
tion. The first step under section 1605(a)(2) is to "define with preci-
sion the activity, and the act in connection with that activity, that
gave rise to plaintiff's claim."'64 In De Sanchez the issuance of the
check was determined to be the crucial activity and the failure to
honor it the crucial act.65 The next step is to determine whether the
defendant's actions were "commercial." Congress left to the courts
the interpretation of this relatively vague designation on which a
party's entitlement to immunity may depend.66 Perhaps the best
means derived for making the determination is the rule of thumb
that an act will be deemed commercial if it is "one in which a private
person could engage ..... ,,67 The difficult delineation in De Sanchez
did not involve the character of the bank 68 but the character of its
dealings with Ms. Sanchez. Federal courts confronted with cases in-
volving the Mexican government's imposition of exchange controls
generally characterized the failure of Mexican banks to honor CDs as
commercial, even where those failures were induced by the exchange
control restrictions. 69 Significantly, however, those banks had en-
tered the market to sell CDs for a profit, an activity generally carried
61 A number of courts involved with restitution of property following World War II
invalidated German exchange controls in light of provisions that discriminated against
Jews. Deklo v. Levi, 12 Piskei-Din 745 (1958), cited in F.A. MANN, supra note 32, at 406
n.25.
62 [1976] 3 All E.R. 417.
63 Id. at 435.
64 Braka v. Bancomer, 589 F. Supp! 1465, 1469 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 762 F.2d 222
(2d Cir. 1985).
65 770 F.2d at 1391.
66 Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1976) (testimony of
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State).
67 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981).
68 Plaintiff never contested that Banco Central was an instrumentality of the Nicara-
guan government. 770 F.2d at 1390 n.5.
69 See Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1469-70; Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1108 (5th
Cir. 1985). But see Frankel v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, No. 82-6457 (S.D.N.Y. May 31,
1983) (promulgation of exchange controls amounts to a breach of contract between the
parties to a CD).
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on by commercial entities. A crucial distinction thus becomes clear.
The purpose of an act is irrelevant under 1605(a)(2), the key is its
nature.
7 0
The De Sanchez court chose not to delineate between the purpose
and nature of Banco Central's actions, concluding that no obvious
distinction could be made. 7' Was the conclusion, however, well-
founded? While the purpose of Banco Central's refusal to honor the
check was to preserve foreign exchange reserves, admittedly a gov-
ernmental interest, the nature of the activity of issuing the check was
arguably commercial, because the issuance came in response to the
request of a commercial bank unable to meet a clearly commercial
obligation. In Braka v. Bancomer,72 which involved the sale of CDs by
a Mexican bank, the court employed a similar rationale in character-
izing such sales. It ruled that the bank's breach
was no more a sovereign act than that of any other debtor, private or
public, that had contracted to repay an obligation in dollars rather
than pesos. That it was prevented from complying with its contract
by a governmental decree flatly prohibiting the use of dollars as
legal tender does not make it immune from suit as an agent of the
Republic of Mexico. 73
Judge Goldberg, however, in De Sanchez chose not to view issuance of
the check as relating back to the original commercial obligation of
Banco Nacional to redeem the CD. Under this construction the deci-
sion appears just. Courts confronted with a national bank's imple-
mentation of exchange restrictions, where no commercial venture is
at issue, have generally treated the actions as governmental. 74 In the
final analysis, the De Sanchez court had little problem dealing with the
typically troubling commercial/governmental distinction but may
have erred by overly confining the scope of the activity in question.
While there is a significant body of case law construing section
1605(a)(2) of the FSIA, the same cannot be said of the other excep-
tions to immunity set out in the Act. Ms. Sanchez also sought to
establish jurisdiction over Banco Central under section 1605(a)(3),
relating to suits involving rights in property taken in violation of in-
ternational law where "such property is present in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States." 75 Judge Goldberg reversed the lower court's determination
that the defendant's action constituted such a taking. The district
court focused on whether Nicaragua engaged in commercial activi-
ties through its C&S account, an admittedly valid issue under section
1605(a)(3). Little consideration, however, was given to the threshold
70 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982).
71 770 F.2d at 1393.
72 589 F. Supp. 1465.
73 Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1470.
74 Id. at 1465.
75 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982).
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inquiry as to whether any violation of international law had occurred.
Admittedly, a taking of property without payment of fair considera-
tion is exactly the type of activity that section 1605(a)(3) is intended
to exempt from immunity.76 International law, however, requires
more. The opposing parties must be of different nations. As stated
by the district court in Palicio v. Brush,7 7 "confiscations by a state of
the property of its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regard-
less of whether compensation has been provided, do not constitute
violations of international law."' 78 While there may be exceptions to
this general rule,79 Judge Goldberg's reliance on it, supported by the
bulk of the case law,80 seems justified on the facts of the present case.
Finally, Ms. Sanchez sought to have jurisdiction conferred on
the basis of section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA which involves noncom-
mercial torts.8 l Plaintiff argued that Banco Central's confiscation of
her funds amounted to a tortious conversion. Again, the district
court accepted her argument,8 2 and the appellate court reversed.
Specifically, Judge Goldberg ruled that the taking involved "is not
the type of tort claim that the exception was intended to cover. Ms.
Sanchez' claim, although sounding in tort, is essentially a claim for
an unjust taking of property. As noted, Congress has provided an
exception in section 1605(a)(3) for takings of property that violate
international law." 8 3 He goes on to cite several judicial interpreta-
tions of a similar provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act8 4 rejecting
attempts by plaintiffs to recharacterize contract and trespass actions
as conversions.8 5
76 H.R. REP., supra note 47 at 19-20. See also Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F.
Supp. 1094, 1107 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
77 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
307 F.2d 845, 861 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
78 256 F. Supp. at 487.
79 Cases analyzing the bounds of international law are few. The most in depth recent
analysis is probably that ofJudge Kaufman in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir.
1980).
That controversy involved the alleged torture of a citizen of Paraguay by other citizens
of that country. In granting jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982), Judge Kaufman stated that under current use and practice, international law "con-
fers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments." He added that
"the ultimate scope of these rights will be a subject for continuing refinement and elabora-
tion." 630 F.2d at 884-85. Subsequent decisions have, however, chosen to limit Filartiga
to its facts. See Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.D.C. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
80 De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1397 n.16.
81 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) grants an exception to sovereign immunity in any case
not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to
or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious
act or omission of that foreign state. ...
82 515 F. Supp. at 912-14.
83 770 F.2d at 1398.
84 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680 (1982).
85 770 F.2d at 1398-99.
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Judge Goldberg's rejection of the conversion claim, thus, rests
on the ground that Congress did not intend section 1605(a)(5) to
encompass such complaints. The legislative history, however, sug-
gests otherwise. The report of the House of Representatives states
that although the section was primarily aimed at the jurisdictional
problem created by traffic accidents involving diplomats, it is none-
theless "cast in general terms as applying to all tort actions for
money damages, not otherwise encompassed by section
1605(a)(2)." 86 Because the court earlier dismissed the plaintiff's
commercial activities action, her claim is obviously not "encom-
passed" by section 1605(a)(2). Judge Goldberg, however, also stated
that the existence of the section 1605(a)(3) exception of the FSIA
(i.e., takings in violation of international law) precluded a conversion
action under the tort exception. The crucial difference between the
two, however, is that the former requires a violation of international
law while the latter does not. Significantly, the very deficiency in
plaintiff's section 1605(a)(2) claim was that there had been no viola-
tion of international law.87 It is simply illogical to allow the more
specific requirement to preclude actions under the more general. 88
An even clearer construction problem with the court's analysis
concerns subsection (a)(5)(B) of the statute. That provision sets out
the specific types of tortious activity that Congress chose to exclude
from the general tort exception to sovereign immunity. Conversion
is not among them.89 A fundamental rule of statutory construction is
that "[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a
general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in
the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent." 90 Thus, a
broad rejection of conversion claims appears to be in contravention
of both the legislative history and statutory language of the FSIA.
Perhaps even more importantly, an explicit, more limited basis
existed for the disposal of the plaintiff's claim. As Judge Goldberg
concluded in a lengthy footnote, "the discretionary function exemp-
86 H.R. REP., supra note 46 at 20-21 (emphasis added).
87 770 F.2d at 1396-98.
88 Judge Goldberg cited several cases refusing to apply the FSIA to causes of action
alternatively categorizable. Id. at 1398-99. In each instance, however, the court recog-
nized a different theory of recovery as obviously more appropriate. Blanchard v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 1965) ("the Tucker Act constitutes the
sole basis for a suit against the United States sounding in contract"); Myers v. United
States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963) (taking of private property specifically prohibited by
fifth amendment). In De Sanchez the jurisdictional grant was governed exclusively by the
FSIA.
8,) Subsection (a)(5)(B) specifically exempts malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(5)(B) (1982). Indeed, one of the alternative grounds in plaintiff's original com-
plaint was for misrepresentation, and it was rejected pursuant to this subsection. 515 F.
Supp. at 912.
1)( Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980).
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tion [§ 1605(a)(5)(A)] provides an additional ground for holding that
the tortious activity exception does not apply." 9' The judge contin-
ued with a persuasive argument that Banco Central's actions fall
under the language of the section.92 Indeed, the argument con-
tained in the footnote is more persuasive and certainly more straight-
forward than the one chosen by the court for the text of its opinion.
Since the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, various provisions of
the Act as well as omissions of the drafters have been subject to criti-
cism. 93 Of the existing provisions, none has given rise to more com-
mentary than the most frequently utilized exception, that for
commercial activities. Suggestions have ranged from those advocat-
ing a more extensive consideration of policy, 94 to those favoring a
complete revision of the "nature of the act" test.9 5 Even greater
concern has been expressed over the drafter's omission of provisions
ensuring the enforcement of arbitration agreements with foreign
states.96
A recently adopted resolution of the American Bar Association's
House of Delegates 97 suggests revising the FSIA to remedy both of
these shortcomings. In response to this resolution, Senator Charles
McC. Mathias (R, Md.) recently introduced legislation to amend and
revise the Act. 98 Extensive alterations are proposed to help ensure
that foreign states and their instrumentalities will no longer use the
FSIA to extract themselves from arbitration agreements that have
become disagreeable. More importantly in the context of the De
Sanchez decision, the legislation proposes broadening the existing
definition of commercial activity to include "any promise to pay
made by a foreign state.., and any guarantee by a foreign state of a
91 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1982) specifically exempts from the tortious exception
any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be
abused.
92 Judge Goldberg stated:
Here, the decision to stop payment on the check was, in my view, clearly
discretionary. Under Nicaraguan law, Banco Central had general supervision
of Nicaragua's currency and foreign exchange .... Given this broad author-
ity, I believe that Banco Central had the discretionary power, under Nicara-
guan law, to preserve Nicaragua's foreign exchange reserves by stopping
payment on checks drawn on its United States dollar accounts.
770 F.2d at 1399 n.19.
93 See Remarks of Beverly Carl, supra note 58.
94 See generally Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50
FORD-AM L. REV. 155 (1981); Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State: The
Needfor a CommercialAct Exception to the CommercialAct Exception, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 763 (1983).
95 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982); see also Comment, Commercial Activity Under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Toward a More Practical Definition, 34 BAYLOR L. REV.
295 (1982).
96 See Sullivan, Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent to Arbitration: Territorial
Scope and Procedural Limits, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329 (1983).
97 Copies of the ABA proposals are available from the American Bar Association,
Section of International Law, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
98 S. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S5363 (daily ed. May 3, 1985).
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promise to pay made by another party." 99 This language would
seemingly encompass acts such as those of the defendant Banco
Central. The issuance of the check to Sanchez certainly would seem
to be a promise to pay. The nature of the government's motive for
breaching that promise, whether governmental or commercial,
would apparently no longer be deemed relevant. Thus, foreign
banks are apt to find it more difficult to evade jurisdiction under the
FSIA in those borderline situations where formerly their actions
would have been deemed governmental.
No longer is the issue of foreign sovereign immunity limited pri-
marily to maritime controversies. The demands of the modern
world economy necessitate a consistent national policy in the area.
Worldwide external indebtedness now exceeds $825 billion, with
$350 billion of that in Latin America alone. ' 0 0 As expressed by one
author: "The current and increasing magnitude of developing coun-
tries' external indebtedness has become an important international
policy issue with major implications for both developed and develop-
ing countries." 0 1 Increasingly, these developing nations are coming
to rely on exchange controls to stabilize their economies. Their
proliferation demands that courts undertake to apply them only in
situations where their enactment and revision is grounded on valid
economic necessity and where their implementation is unbiased.
The De Sanchez decision, it is hoped, serves to illustrate this necessity
and some of the other difficulties that can arise in the application of
the FSIA. It may well be that the Mathias bill, if enacted, will con-
tribute to the resolution of these problems. Continued legislative
scrutiny is nonetheless imperative to promote a consistent U.S. pol-
icy to deal with an increasingly complex and turbulent world political
and economic scene.
STUART F. CLAYTON, JR.
99 Id. For the text of the proposed amendments, see 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 784-89
(1985).
100 1985 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 60, 262.
101 DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT, supra note 31, at xi.
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